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SENIORITY AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE ACADEMIC 
LABOR MARKET 
Christopher B. Barrett and Dee Von Bailey 
Abstract 
Following the recent exchange between Ransom and Hallock, we examine the 
determinants of faculty salaries and find that once one controls for productivity indicators, 
seniority appears to have a significant effect on faculty salaries. Simply put, productivity pays 
and there is no evidence of university monopsony power. Faculty salaries are almost solely 
determined by academic discipline, rank, and productivity, as manifest by grantsmanship activity 
and the elicitation of competing offers from other universities. Perhaps surprisingly, once one 
controls for grants won and rank, both of which appear to be influenced by a faculty member's 
publication rate, published research appears to offer little or no salary returns. 
SENIORITY AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE ACADEMIC 
LABOR MARKETI 
Understanding the determinants of university faculty salaries is important both to 
academic career planning and to possible legal and institutional issues like discrimination, the 
incentive effects of the tenure system, or the exercise of oligopsony power by universities that 
might prompt faculty unionization. Recent work by Michael Ransom in the March 1993 issue of 
American Economic Review reports that, while most professions reward employee seniority with 
increased salaries, seniority at large research universities seems to have a negative marginal 
effect on faculty salaries. Ransom interprets his evidence as being consistent with 
monopsonistic salary discrimination by universities, wherein individuals with high 
(unobservable) moving costs receive lower salaries and accumulate greater seniority at a 
university than do individuals with low moving costs. In a comment on Ransom's paper, Kevin 
Hallock (1995) employs a different data set, from the University of Massachusetts (UMASS), 
and finds, contrary to Ransom's results, that seniority seems to bring positive salary returns, as 
seems an empirical regularity in many other industries. Hallock acknowledges, however, that 
these results might be attributable to the faculty union at UMAS S; the faculty are not unionized 
at the University of Arizona, from which Ransom's key comparable data come. 
This brief paper extends the Ransom-Hallock debate. We examine the determinants of 
salaries for the faculty with research appointments in the agricultural experiment station (ABS) 
lAssistant Professor and Professor, respectively, Department of Economics, Utah State University, Logan, 
UT 84322-3530. Seniority of authorship is shared equally. We thank Chris Fawson for comments and Mike 
Ransom for helpful comments and for providing supplementary results from his own work. Some of the data used 
were provided by the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station (UAES). The opinions expressed in this paper are solely 
our own and do not represent either the UAES or Utah State University. 
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at Utah State University, a land-grant university and, like Arizona and Massachusetts, a Carnegie 
Research University I. Like Arizona, Utah State's faculty are not organized into a union. In this 
data set, we find that once one controls for productivity indicators, seniority appears to have an 
insignificant effect on faculty salaries. Simply put, productivity pays and there is no evidence of 
university monopsony power. 
There are three primary reasons to pursue this issue further . First, the suggestion that 
universities exercise monopsonistic control over faculty colors the tone of faculty-administration 
relations on campus and therefore demands careful scrutiny. The appearance of monopsony 
power exerted by a university over individual faculty members may elicit calls for unionization 
to achieve bargaining power and thus a potentially more efficient bilateral monopoly 
equilibrium. Faculty unionization is an active topic on several major research university 
campuses; the debate over seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market speaks directly 
to this topic. Second, the institution of tenure is being carefully scrutinized by many institutions, 
perhaps especially in public universities, because of a public perception that salary and job 
security are unrelated to faculty productivity: The regression specifications employed by 
Hallock and Ra~som feed such perceptions by assuming faculty salary is unrelated to 
productivity. We feel that issue deserves more careful review. Third, an understanding of which 
activities generally raise salary levels can aid faculty members in optimally allocating time and 
effort among competing time demands and in making strategic career decisions. Such 
information is too often lacking in mentoring of graduate students and junior faculty. Hallock 
and Ransom both overlook this dimension of the empirical evidence despite its clear importance 
to members of the academy. 
2 
The Effects of Seniority on Salary 
Ransom examines several different data sets and, after correcting for rank, discipline, 
gender, race, quality of Ph.D.-granting institution, and the length of contract, concludes that 
(1) experience has a strong but decreasing marginal effect on faculty salaries, (2) seniority has a 
negative marginal effect on faculty salaries, and (3) changing employers increases annual faculty 
salaries by between 5%-160/0, depending on the data set analyzed and the amount of seniority. 
Drawing on models that relate worker productivity and seniority (Harris and Holmstrom 1982; 
Lazear 1986), Ransom then tries tQ control for worker quality by also including professional 
publications as a regressor. He finds publication activity has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on salaries, but the strong negative correlation between salaries and seniority 
persists? On that basis, Ransom concludes that the negative seniority profile observed in faculty 
salaries cannot be attributed to quality differentiation. He then proceeds to develop a 
"heterogeneity" model of monopsonistic discrimination wherein moving costs drive a wedge 
between the market wage and the wage the employing university must pay to retain a faculty 
member. 
Our principal concern about Ransom's heterogeneity model is that it relies on moving 
costs which his regression results imply are extraordinarily (and in our view implausibly) large 
in order to inhibit faculty from changing universities. 3 Unless faculty systematically fail to 
consider the future salary effects of changing their seniority, one would expect faculty to 
2The table reporting these results was inadvertently omitted from the published paper, but Professor 
Ransom kindly provided us with the unpublished results. 
3While individuals might face high idiosyncratically high-moving costs due to geographic preferences or 
family circumstances, it is unlikely that this is a characteristic of the full faculty popUlation whose salaries are 
estimated in the regressions. 
3 
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compare the net present value of the compensation stream available from an alternative potential 
employer with that from the incumbent university. Even using a conservative annual discount 
rate of 10%, Ransom's results imply that switching research universities offers considerable net 
present added value, for instance 10%-78% of annual salary over a ten-year horizon for a faculty 
member with ten years' seniority.4 We doubt such large estimates accurately represent the 
central tendency of frictions caused by moving costs in the faculty labor market. The empirical 
evidence Ransom marshalls to demonstrate a negative unconditional seniority profile in the 
academic labor market is impressive, but we find his explanation of the phenomenon 
unconvIncIng. 
Hallock (1995) challenges Ransom's conclusions with results obtained using a 1989 data 
set for faculty salaries from the University of Massachusetts. Hallock uses several model 
specifications, in general finding a positive but declining return to seniority for faculty during the 
first 15 or so years of employment. Hallock's results are robust to several alternative 
specifications, but none that include measures of faculty productivity. While acknowledging that 
the unionization of UMAS S faculty might account for the positive returns to seniority at that 
institution, Hallock interprets his results as calling into question Ransom's findings. 
I 
There are reasons to discount Hallock's challenge to Ransom. Not only is Hallock's, like 
ours, a study of just one university's faculty, as compared to Ransom's use of data sets from two 
different universities as well as national faculty survey data, but we suspect that unionization at 
UMAS S exerts considerable influence over the relationship between faculty seniority and 
salaries. As Hallock acknowledges, Barbezat (1989) has found that collective bargaining 
4We assume universities are engaged in limit pricing-setting wages equal to market wage less moving 
costs. 
arrangements in higher education increase the returns to seniority. Moreover, Hallock's 
empirical results suffer the same logical flaw as Ransom's. The magnitude of the statistically 
significant parameter estimates on the seniority coefficients imply faculty systematically fail to 
consider the net present value effects on salary that come from either resetting or maintaining 
their seniority clocks. Years of casual conversation with colleagues considering moving to other 
universities suggest to us that this is incredible. While Ransom's estimates imply extraordinarily 
large moving costs to justify faculty remaining at the incumbent university, Hallock's estimates 
imply faculty utility that is decreasing in income to justify any faculty leaving UMAS Sand 
thereby not only incurring moving costs but also forsaking the seniority premium Hallock seems 
to find. For instance, the stylized faculty member with ten years' seniority and an annual 
discount rate of 10% considered earlier would reap 10%-54% of annual salary in net present 
value added over the next ten years from staying at UMASS versus leaving for another research 
university. While we have not any empirical evidence on this point, we doubt UMASS has the 
exceptionally high faculty retention rates such a forecast would suggest. 5 
Whether negative or positive, the existence of a significant relationship between seniority 
and faculty salary, as found by both Hallock and Ransom, is most likely due to omission of 
, 
variables that relate to both seniority and salary. A productive and, therefore, marketable faculty 
member can choose whether or not to reset her seniority clock by changing universities and 
thereby enjoy (bear) whatever net present value gain (loss) accrues purely through that one 
5The apparently positive seniority-salary relationship at universities with collective bargaining agreements 
raises the question of whether there is a significantly lower rate of voluntary resignations (i.e. , of tenured faculty) 
from unionized campuses, as compared to nonunionized campuses. This is a good topic for future research that 
would convey significant information about how unionization affects universities ' ability to adjust tenured faculty 
size to external shocks. 
5 
strategic choice. Therefore, if seniority truly exerts significant influence over faculty salaries, 
one should observe either (1) extraordinary faculty turnover rates (if moving costs are low and 
there is a negative seniority-salary relationship), (2) extraordinary moving costs associated with 
changing universities (if there is a negative seniority-salary relationship and faculty turnover 
rates are low), or (3) remarkably low faculty turnover rates (if there is a positive seniority-salary 
relationship). Given the absence of empirical evidence supporting any of these three options, we 
are strongly inclined to believe the empirical findings of Hallock and Ransom mask a more 
intuitive relationship between faculty productivity and salaries. 
The Model 
We therefore build on the analyses by Ransom and Hallock by paying greater attention to 
how faculty productivity might influence salary levels. Besides measuring the effects of 
traditional demographic variables (gender, race, seniority, and experience) on faculty 
compensation, we also control for the university matching a competitive external offer and 
examine the impact of scholarly publications and grant activity on salary levels. We assume that 
universities raid other campuses in an attempt to poach highly productive faculty members. In 
particular, anecdotal evidence suggests that raids are often related not only to historical research 
productivity, which would be captured in measures of publications and grants won, but also to a 
faculty member's prospective administrative abilities, teaching excellence, or prominence in a 
field of growing importance. While it is a crude method, the existence of a matching offer thus 
conveys information on faculty quality that is otherwise unmeasurable. We find in our data that 
matches of competitive offers and grantsmanship activity have large, positive, and statistically 
significant effects on salary levels. Moreover, when one controls for these effects, seniority 
6 
effects become statistically insignificant. The implication is that the negative seniority profile 
one commonly finds in faculty salary data, as reported by Ransom, seems to fit the Harris and 
Holmstrom or Lazear models in which the imperfect information prevailing at the time of initial 
faculty hire drives a negative relationship between seniority and productivity and thus between 
seniority and salaries. 
Following Ransom and Hallock, we define seniority in this paper as the number of years 
the faculty member has been employed by the university. Experience is defined as the number 
of years since completion of the terminal degree. We modify Ransom and Hallock's model to 
include detail on the number of quality publications the faculty member had and their grant 
activity, measured in thousands of dollars, during the most recent five-year period, as well as a 
dummy variable to represent whether the faculty member's salary was increased to match an 
external competitive offer. Thus, the basic model is as follows: 
+ 82PUB· + 83MATCH. + rh 11 ACE· + rh_H'EMALE· + \' .rh ·DEPT·· + E · 1 1 \f'r~.... 1 \f'p- 1 L..-J\f'J 1J 1 
where Sj is the 1996 salary of the ith faculty member; EX is years of experience since the 
terminal degree was awarded; SEN is years of seniority at the institution; ASC is a dummy 
variable for associate professor rank; FULL is a dummy variable for full professor rank; 
GRANT$ is thousands of dollars from grants awarded between 1991 and 1995 inclusive; PUB is 
the number of "Type I" publications (this includes refereed journal articles, books, and chapters 
in books) between 1991 and 1995 inclusive;6 MATCH is a dummy variable taking unit value if 
6We initially treated sole- and joint-authored publications separately, but found they had basically the same 
impact on salary levels. Consequently, they are combined here to conserve degrees of freedom. We also estimated 
this relationship including nonrefereed publications and presentations as a separate regressor to capture 
service-oriented research publications. This had no significant impact on salaries for any of the specifications 
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the university matched a competitive external offer for the faculty member in the past five years ~ 
DEPT are binary variables representing the ith faculty member's department, with the 
Department of Sociology, Social Work, and Anthropology as the base~ RACE is a binary 
variable equal to 1 for non-Caucasians and 0 otherwise~ FEMALE is 1 for females and 0 for 
males~ and Ei is the iid, normal disturbance term. The squared terms for experience and seniority 
(EXP2 and SEN2) are included, as in Ransom and Hallock, to permit a nonlinear effect on 
salaries and are scaled by dividing by 100. A White (1980) test revealed no significant 
heteroscedasticity, so we estimate the model using ordinary least squares. The single-log 
specification permits interpretation of the parameter estimates as percentages. 
The notation on the parameter estimates reveals our strategy in researching this question. 
The p parameters relate to longevity (experience and seniority), the e parameters are associated 
with indicators of productivity, and the <p parameters relate to demographic conditioning 
variables beyond the faculty member's control. Previous studies have excluded the e parameters 
(with partial exception noted above of Ransom's work). We are concerned that this omission 
leads to mistaken inference about the nature of the labor market for research university faculty. 
The Data 
The data are taken from salary information for 1995 provided by the Utah Agricultural 
Experiment Station, adjusted when necessary to place all on a comparable twelve-month basis. 
Administrators and nontenure track appointments are excluded~ only those designated as 
professor, associate professor, or assistant professor are considered. Table 1 presents descriptive 
estimated, so we use only Type I pUblications as a proxy for all research activities. Finally, we also estimated a 
quadratic relation between research publications and faculty salaries but found this had no significant effect on the 
regression results, so we report only the simpler specification. 
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statistics on salaries by rank and gender. Table 2 provides gender specific information regarding 
age, experience, seniority, quality of terminal degree-granting institution, grant activity, and 
publications. Mean salaries for women are less than men, but women also tend to be younger, 
have fewer years of experience and seniority, have won fewer grant dollars, and have fewer 
publications than their male counterparts (Table 2). 
Table 1. Average Salaries for Male and Female Faculty Members by Academic Rank 
Rank 
Female assistant professors 
Male assistant professors 
Female associate professors 
Male associate professors 
Female professors 
Male professors 
Total 
No. of 
Observations 
10 
19 
5 
34 
3 
52 
123 
Average 
Salary 
$50,764 
50,817 
53,519 
57,482 
64,323 
70~938 
$61,601 
Maximum 
$63 ,632 
65,864 
62,592 
72,000 
71,684 
94,515 
$94,515 
Minimum 
$43,908 
38,322 
48,590 
40,619 
58,811 
49~890 
$38,322 
Table 2. Personal Characteristic and Productivity Measures by Gender 
Item 
Mean age 
Mean experience 
Mean seniority 
Proportion of terminal degrees from Carnegie I 
research universities 
Mean dollars in grants during the study period 
Mean number of type I publications during the 
study period 
Mean salary 
Female 
42.9 years 
10.5 years 
8.1 years 
82.0% 
$16,228 
10.1 
$53 ,789 
Male 
49.2 years 
18.7 years 
16.0 years 
90.0% 
$23 ,672 
10.7 
$62,831 
9 
10 
Productivity Drives Faculty Salaries 
We first estimate the model in equation (1) using the specifications found in Ransom and 
Hallock. These results are reported in Table 3. Our specification 1 replicates Ransom's Table 6 
and Hallock's equation (5), omitting productivity indicators and faculty rank. As Hoffman 
(1976) points out, omitting rank captures any indirect effects race or gender might have on salary 
through their influence on the unobserved rate of promotion. Our coefficient estimates then have 
the same sign as Hallock's, with positive linear terms and negative quadratic terms, but the 
statistically significant estimates reveal salaries to be linearly increasing in experience and 
Table 3. Returns to Longevity and Productivity at Utah State University 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Independent 
Variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 
Experience 0.020** 0.018* 0.009 0.008 0.008 
(0.010) (0.010) (0 .009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Experience21l 00 -0.009 -0.011 0.003 -0.001 -0 .001 
(0.023) (0.023) (0 .021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Seniority 0.016 0.016 -0.001 -0.006 -0 .005 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
SeniorityZll 00 -0.067** -0.059* -0.031 -0 .013 -0.013 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0 .025) (0 .025) 
Associate professor 0.082* 0.098** 0.098** 
(0 .049) (0.049) (0 .050) 
Full professor 0.301 t 0.337t 0.337t 
(0.072) (0.075) (0 .075) 
Grants ($1000s) 0.0005* 0.0005* 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
Publications 0.003* 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.002) (0.0016 (0.0016) 
Match outside offer 0.144** 0.144** 
(0.073) (0 .073) 
Hired with tenure 0.004 
(0.063) 
Adjusted R2 0.574 0.585 0.673 0.691 0.687 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural logarithm of annual salary on a twelve month basis. Each model also 
includes an intercept term and dummy variables for the faculty member's department, gender, and race. Estimated from 123 
observations. 
*Indicates significantly different than zero at the 10% level. 
**Indicates significantly different than zero at the 5% level. 
tIndicates significantly different than zero at the 1 % level. 
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quadratically decreasing in seniority. So we have essentially the negative seniority-salary profile 
Ransom finds in a broad array of empirical evidence. In specification 2, we also include 
publications, as in Ransom's unpublished Table 6. Just as in Ransom, we find that research 
publications have a modest, statistically significantly positive effect on faculty salaries, but one 
that leaves the estimated relationship between longevity variables and salary essentially 
unchanged. The statistically significant relationship between seniority and salary is still 
negative. However, if we modify specification 1 to include faculty rank rather than publications, 
as Hallock does in his equation (6), we find in our specification 3 that the magnitudes of the 
coefficient estimates on the longevity variables all diminish considerably and none of the 
parameter estimates are statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on the rank dummies, 
in contrast, indicate promotion to associate or full professor brings an 8% or 30% salary gain, 
respectively, and those estimates are statistically significant. Rank may be endogenous, but it 
also presumably proxies for some unobservable measures of past and/or present faculty 
quality-notably service, the quality of research publications, and the faculty member' s 
reputation in the profession at large. Moreover, the unconditional relationship between rank and 
either salary or longevity measures (experience and seniority) is less strong than commonly 
I 
believed. There are many senior associate professors and relatively low paid full professors in 
our sample, and in research universities more generally. 
When we add in all the indicators of faculty productivity-publications, grants won, 
rank, and matches of outside offers-seniority appears to have no economically or statistically 
significant influence on salary levels (specification 4). There is a mildly negative seniority 
profile, but it is not statistically significantly different from zero. The coefficients on rank, 
12 
grantsmanship activity, the presence of a matching offer and the faculty member's discipline (not 
shown) are the only statistically significant parameter estimates, all of them positive. 7 The clear 
implication is that the university rewards productivity that earns promotion or elicits raids from 
other campuses or extramural funding. The coefficient estimates on both the gender and race 
variables (not shown) are negative but statistically insignificantly different from zero and of 
quite small magnitude in the case of gender. 
Hallock also reports that he introduced a dummy variable (HWT) equal to one for those 
faculty hired with tenure and equal to zero otherwise, and found that those hired with tenure 
received 7%-18% more in annual salary than those hired without it. Hallock interprets this result 
as supporting Ransom's monopsony argument, although he never explains why this implies the 
exercise of market power by the hiring university. Indeed, to us HWT seems instead to be an 
imperfect control for faculty quality, much in the spirit of our MATCH variable. The important 
difference is that Hallock's HWT variable may capture quite dated information on a senior 
faculty member hired with tenure decades earlier, while our MATCH variable captures only 
more recent market activity. The Harris and Holmstrom model again appears relevant, for when 
a university hires a faculty member with tenure it is still employing someone of unknown future 
productivity, albeit with better information than generally exists on hires without tenure. The 
better indicator of the faculty member's productivity over time is thus not whether she was hired 
with tenure ex ante but whether other universities bid for her services as that productivity 
becomes public knowledge ex post. Indeed, when we reestimate specification 4 to include the 
7Faculty in the Departments of Biological Engineering (22.8%), Economics (22 .9%), and Forestry (14.4%), 
and staff scientists in the Agricultural Experiment Station (27 .1 %) were the only ones to earn statistically significant 
salary premiums over the default Department of Sociology, Social Work and Anthropology. 
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HWT variable, it is positive but statistically insignificantly different from zero, while the other 
parameter estimates are essentially unchanged. The existence of salary matches of outside offers 
seems the relevant measure of current faculty productivity. 
The clear implication of our results is that at least this one, nonunionized research 
university does not seem to discriminate monopsonistically against faculty members based on 
their heterogeneous moving costs. While the seniority profile does indeed appear negative when 
one fails to control for faculty productivity, as the mass of evidence presented by Ransom 
indicates, the salary-seniority profile appears to mask a negative relationship between seniority 
and productivity that is reasonably captured by the models of Harris and Holmstrom or Lazear. 
Controlling appropriately for faculty productivity, the academic labor market appears reasonably 
competitive. 
Moreover, these empirical results provide two counterpoints to the increasingly popular 
argument that faculty pay is unrelated to productivity. First, the biggest effects on salary come 
from promotion and from competitive bidding that induces universities to match outside offers. 
As long as a university' s promotion screening process is appropriately rigorous, and unless one 
believes that universities routinely attempt to hire away their rivals' mediocre faculty, rather than 
.I 
their best, productivity pays. Moreover, recall that our grants, publications, and MATCH 
variables count only performance from the past five years. The statistically significant positive 
coefficient estimates on grants and matching offers suggest that, conditional on the other 
variables, salary adjusts downward if there is a prolonged, pronounced decrease in faculty 
productivity. This should somewhat comfort those concerned about the incentives tenure might 
create. 
14 
Implications for Career Planning 
The estimated determinants of faculty salaries at research universities are of interest not 
only for the information they convey about the nature of the academic labor market-is it 
competitive or monopsonistic?, is faculty pay related to productivity or not?-but also for the 
guidance they offer young faculty in career planning. The clear implication of the results 
presented above is that once one has chosen a discipline (and economics appears to be a good 
choice indeed, see note 7), then there are only a few activities that will ultimately significantly 
influence one's salary. If salary maximization is an objective, then one should earn promotion to 
associate and then full professor, pursue and win grant money, and attract job offers from 
competing universities. 
Publications might help earn a faculty member promotion and extramural grants, as 
suggested by the positive and statistically significant estimate of 82 in specification 2, which 
shrinks in magnitude and becomes insignificant once one controls for rank and grants in 
specifications 4 and 5. The indirect effects of publications should not be understated, since rank 
plays a major part in determining faculty salaries. Full professors' salaries are 30%-34% higher 
than assistant professors after adjusting for longevity, productivity, and other demographic 
variables. 
But publish-or-perish is not the same as publish-and-richen. Once promoted to full 
professor, publications themselves seem to have little direct effect on salary levels. The sample 
mean number of publications (10.6 over five years, or more than four times the average 
publication rate for Ph.D. economists [Hutchinson and Zivney 1995]) increased annual faculty 
salary by less than one-tenth of 1 %. Forcing one' s university to match a competing outside offer 
typically increases annual salary by about 14%. Grantsmanship likewise seems to bring 
considerable salary returns. A single $100,000 grant in a five-year period increases annual 
salary by almost 5%. Research universities appear to expect regular publications from their 
faculty and thus offer no significant rewards to published research. Indeed, we have heard 
administrators articulate the view that publications are the logical by-product of contract 
research. It appears that the university engages in a form of revenue sharing with faculty who 
bring in extramural funds to support the institution and its missions. 
Conclusions 
15 
Our results contradict recent empirical evidence, offered in this Review by both Ransom 
and Hallock, which suggests that perhaps research universities exercise monopsonistic control 
over faculty. This control is supposedly manifest in the widespread negative relationship 
between faculty seniority and salary, as documented by Ransom, or in the significant salary 
premium that accrues to faculty hired with tenure by a university, according to Hallock. But 
neither of those papers makes a serious attempt to control for faculty productivity. Using data 
from one Carnegie Research University I, we find that seniority has insignificant effects on 
faculty salary, which is almost solely determined by a faculty member's academic discipline, her 
rank, and her productivity, as manifest by grantsmanship activity and the elicitation of 
competing offers from other universities. Perhaps surprisingly, once one controls for grants won 
and rank, both of which appear to be influenced by a faculty member's publication rate, 
published research appears to offer little or no salary returns. 
These results suggest that calls for faculty unionization based on the perception that 
universities exercise monopsonistic power in the academic labor market may be misinformed or 
16 
premature. It likewise challenges the increasingly popular cry that faculty salaries are unrelated 
to productivity. Our results represent conditions at only one land-grant university and should 
clearly be checked using data from other institutions. But our evidence suggests that faculty pay 
is indeed related to productivity, generally along the lines of the well-established models of 
Harris and Holmstrom or Lazear. 
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